Notes
Slide Show
Outline
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2005 CEFER Conference
On the Predictive Power of Crude-Oil Forward Prices
 
Houston, February 18, 2005
  • Vincent Kaminski
  • Rice University


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The Challenge
  • Marking-to-market long-term positions in trading portfolios
  • Committing capital to long-term projects
  • Requires assumptions about future price levels
  • The rationale for using forward price curves in trading and investment decisions: The triumph of optimism over experience
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EXPERIENCE
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Construction of Forward Price Curves in Practice
  • Forward price curves used in the practice of the energy markets are constructed, in most cases, in a very eclectic way, especially for longer tenors
  • The front segment of a forward price curve is typically taken from a futures contract traded on an organized exchange, possibly adjusted for basis
  • For longer tenors, the industry uses information from the OTC markets coming in the form of calendar, mostly year-on-year, spreads
    • A trader has to apply seasonality coefficients to the annual or quarterly spreads
  • The back of the curve typically comes from a fundamental model
  • This is a highly stylized description of the current practice. Every market has its own conventions and standards.
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Construction of a Forward Curve
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Examples: Natural Gas (1)
  • Hockey stick natural gas forward price curve in the early 1990s
  • The long term prices (beyond three years) were driven by the cogen industry
  • The long term prices reflected unique regulatory framework (PURPA) and market structure (captive long-term buyers, shrewd speculators)
  • The long-term prices collapsed when deregulation undermined the cogen business
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Examples: Natural Gas (2)
  • The underlying volumes in the back of the curve were small
  • Example: Hedging a purchase of a large natural gas field could take a year of accumulating trading positions
    • Lessons learned: The forward price curves contain information for specific volumes
    • Market structure matters
    • Keynes correctly pointed out that the balance between natural longs and natural shorts matters
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Examples: Power (1)
  • “Dash to gas” in the late 1990s and early 2000s lead to considerable excess of generation capacity in many regions of the US
  • The investment decisions were based on the “forward price curves” based on two approaches
    • Fundamental models of supply and demand
    • Steady state equilibrium concept
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Examples: Power (2)
  • Steady state equilibrium
    • Power plants will be constructed  in the future, therefore power prices will support the business of producing power
  • Fundamental models require multiple assumptions about:
    • Fuel prices
    • Future levels of economic activity
    • Generation and transmission capacity
    • Market design and customer behavior
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Examples: Power (3)
  • Lessons learned
    • Forecasts fail because people act (or do not act) on forecasts
    • Small changes in assumptions to the fundamental models  produce huge changes to the end results that accumulate over time. A wide range of forecasts can be generated through manipulation of inputs.
    • Compensation mechanisms and organizational pressures influence the  choice of models. Moral hazard leads to the creation of a market for forecasts.
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Examples: Manipulation
  • Small volumes of transactions for long tenors allow to create the illusion of a true market
  • In the best case, the long-term forward prices reveal what a few traders think (or do not think) about long-term prices. There is only limited information discovery and aggregation.
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THEORY
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Empirical Tests of Predictive Power of Futures Prices
  • Most tests use short term futures prices
  • Practically all tests use regression or cointegration analysis
  • If you saw a few, you have seen all of them
  • In general, the evidence is mixed and varies from commodity to commodity and time period to time period
  • Recommendations vary from one extreme to another (full reliance on the futures prices to contrarian actions)
  • Two examples:
    • Menzie Chinn, Michael Le Blanc, Olivier Coibion, NBER, 2005
    • Benjamin MirandaTabak, 2003
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Chinn and Others
  • Chinn and others used 1990 – 2004/October NYMEX data (except for the natural gas contract that opened in 1991)
  • Futures are unbiased predictors of crude, gasoline, heating oil at the 3 months horizon (but not in the case of natural gas)
  • Futures prices explain a small proportion of the variation in the underlying commodity prices
  • ARMA models don’t offer superior forecasting performance compared to futures prices
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Chinn and Others (2)
  • Futures and spot price relationship is given by
    • f(t,t+k) – s(t) = d(t,t+k) + Q(t,t+k)
    • f(t,t+k) – futures price of the contract maturing at  the time t+k, as of time t
    • s(t) – spot price at time t
    • d(t,t+k) - cost of carry
    • Q(t,t+k) – adjustment for the MTM feature of the futures contract
    • All variables used are represented by their logarithmic values
  • Regression equation used by the authors
    • s(t+k) – s(t) = b0 + b1 (f(t,t+k) – s(t))+ et
    • b1 is equal to 1 if the basis is the optimal predictor of the change in the spot price
    • It is assumed that the log spot price follows the a random walk with a drift and expectations are rational
    • The idea goes back to Fama (1984)
  • Limitations of the cost of carry models and random walk for commodities are well known
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Chinn and Others:  Reported Adjusted R2 (3)
  • Crude oil
    • 3   months:   0.05
    • 6   months:   0.06
    • 12 months:  0.10
  • Natural gas
    • 3   months:   0.17
    • 6   months:   0.25
    • 12 months:  0.35
  • Gasoline
    • 3   months:   0.09
    • 6   months:   0.18
    • 12 months:  0.23
  • Heating Oil
    • 3   months:   0.15
    • 6   months:   0.13
    • 12 months:  0.17
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Tabak:  Reported Adjusted R2
  • Tabak investigated short term Brent IPE contracts, January 1990 to December 2000
  • Fama (1984) was used as in the case of the previous study for the logarithms of the prices
  • Slope estimates b1 and adjusted R2
    • One - month contract:       0.81857,  15.57%
    • Two - months contract:     0.95326,  19.58%
    • Three – months contract:  1.01927,  19.02%
  • The expectation hypothesis (futures prices predict realized spot prices) implies parameters restrictions for b0 =0 , b1 =1. Joint test was performed for H0: b1 =1, b1 =1. The hypothesis could not be rejected for all the three contract maturities included in the study.
  • The hypothesis of unbiased predictive power of the futures oil prices is rejected if the full sample is divided into sub-samples corresponding to the periods of upward or downward trending prices.
  • In any case, the predictive power of the futures prices is low.
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Tabak:  Cointegration Analysis (1)
  • Engle-Granger approach was used for the futures and spot prices
  • The null hypothesis of non-stationarity could not be rejected for the  one- and two-month contracts
  • Cointegration regressions of the spot prices on the futures prices (a, b, R2)
    • One-months: 0.078525, 0.971888, 80.98%
    • Two-months: 0.122782, 0.961548, 68.92%
  • The residuals of the one-month contract equation are I(0)
  • The results above were confirmed using  Johansen (1988) approach
    • Cointegrating vectors:
    • One-months: 1, -0.9981
    • Two-months: 1, -1.0006
  • The conclusion: Information contained in one time-series contains the information that allows to predict another one. The model relating the two is relatively simple.
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WHY USE FORWARD PRICES?
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The Case for Futures Prices
  • We should use forward prices because
    • 1. It’s cool
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The Case for Futures Prices
  • We should use forward prices because
    • 1. It’s cool
    • 2. The engineers don’t know what we are talking about and it makes us look smart
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The Case for Futures Prices
  • We should use forward prices because
    • 1. It’s cool
    • 2. The engineers don’t know what we are talking about and it makes us look smart
    • 3. My boss said so
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The Case for Futures Prices
  • We should use forward prices because
    • 1. It’s cool
    • 2. The engineers don’t know what we are talking about and it makes us look smart
    • 3. My boss said so
    • 4. Our friendly accountant signed off on our forward price curve
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The Case for Futures Prices
  • We should use forward prices because
    • 1. It’s cool
    • 2. The engineers don’t know what we are talking about and it makes us look smart
    • 3. My boss said so
    • 4. Our friendly accountant signed off on our forward price curve
    • 5. It’s supported by the efficient market hypothesis
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The Case for Futures Prices
  • We should use forward prices because
    • 1. It’s cool
    • 2. The engineers don’t know what we are talking about and it makes us look smart
    • 3. My boss said so
    • 4. Our friendly accountant signed off on our forward price curve
    • 5. It’s supported by the efficient market hypothesis
    • 6. Alan Greenspan is encouraged by the level of the oil futures prices of 2010 maturity
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The Case for Futures Prices
  • We should use forward prices because
    • 1. It’s cool
    • 2. The engineers don’t know what we are talking about and it makes us look smart
    • 3. My boss said so
    • 4. Our friendly accountant signed off on our forward price curve
    • 5. It’s supported by the efficient market hypothesis
    • 6. Alan Greenspan is encouraged by the level of the oil futures prices of 2010 maturity
    • 7. We don’t know any better
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